Evolutionary Psychology by Downes, Stephen M.
  330
330
28
EVOLUTIONARY 
PSYCHOLOGY
Stephen M. Downes
Introduction
Evolutionary psychology is a research program in the social sciences that explains human behav-
ior in terms of evolved mechanisms that underlie the relevant behavior. Evolutionary psycholo-
gists aim to account for a large range of human behavior in this way, ranging from the choice of 
sexual partners, parenting and violent conflict between individuals to social organization, cul-
tural practices and the production and use of artifacts. Evolutionary psychologists present their 
approach as a necessary one for the social and behavioral sciences and often support the stronger 
view that their approach should supplant other social science research programs (cf. Rosenberg 
1980 on sociobiology).
Clark Barrett, in his recent systematic presentation and defense of evolutionary psychology, 
says “There are few things more obvious than the fact that we are products of evolution” (2015, 
1). He goes on to say that despite the fact that all modern- day scientists agree with this state-
ment, in the social sciences “there are few things a scientist can do to generate more controversy 
than to make a claim that [a given] feature of human thought or behavior is the product of 
evolution” (ibid.). The evidence for this is the “barrage of criticism that is directed at the field 
of evolutionary psychology” (ibid.). In his view, as evolutionary psychology has become more 
visible and grown in stature, controversy about it has increased.
Debates about evolutionary psychology range from local and focused discussions about evolu-
tionary theory to wider- scope discussions about culture and politics. Evolutionary psychologists 
have fielded criticism from cultural anthropologists, evolutionary anthropologists, evolution-
ary biologists, philosophers (including feminist philosophers, philosophers of biology and phi-
losophers of mind), psychologists, and sociologists. In philosophy there are several books whose 
main focus is criticizing evolutionary psychology and associated approaches to explaining human 
behavior (see e.g. Barker 2015; Buller 2005; Dupre 2001; Prinz 2012; Richardson 2007). Some 
critics object to the idea that human behavior and culture are amenable to evolutionary expla-
nation, but this line of criticism does not capture all dimensions of debates about evolution-
ary psychology. Evolutionary anthropologists are also in the business of providing evolutionary 
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explanations of human behavior and culture, yet they are among the sharpest critics of evolu-
tionary psychology (see e.g. S. Hrdy 1999). In what follows we review the key issues in some of 
the different debates about evolutionary psychology. First, we briefly introduce the evolutionary 
psychologists’ research program.
Evolutionary Psychology’s Research Program
Evolutionary psychology is an outgrowth of sociobiology (cf. Griffiths 2006, 2011). Sociobiologists 
argued that human nature should be accounted for in evolutionary terms (see e.g. Wilson 1978). 
On this view, our nature, expressed in universal human behaviors and cultural practices, is a 
product of our genes. The reason the traits making up our nature are universal is that the genes 
underlying these traits have been fixed in the population by natural selection. In contrast with 
sociobiologists, evolutionary psychologists change the locus of explanation from genes to psy-
chological mechanisms. On this view, human nature, again expressed in our universal behaviors 
and cultural practices, is best understood as a collection of evolved psychological mechanisms 
(Cosmides, Tooby, and Barkow 1992; Tooby and Cosmides 1990, 2005). These evolved psycho-
logical mechanisms are specialized. Evolutionary psychologists argue that we see all manner of 
specialized morphological traits that adapt us to specific features of our environment— livers 
remove toxins and lungs oxygenate the blood— and we should expect to see analogous differen-
tiation in our psychological mechanisms (see e.g. Barrett 2015; Confer et al. 2010). Evolutionary 
psychologists resist the idea that what makes humans successful is a highly flexible mind that is 
a general processor. They argue that such a general processor is highly unlikely to be the product 
of an evolutionary process that allowed us to adapt to survive multiple distinct environmental 
challenges. Rather, evolution produces many special- purpose mechanisms that fit with specific 
aspects of the world (Barrett 2015; Confer et al. 2010). As Barrett puts it “There are many ways 
in which the mind is ‘fitted,’ or shaped, to the world in which it operates, and all aspects of mind- 
world fit must, ultimately, be the result of the evolutionary process” (2015, 7). Our flexibility is 
the result of many specialized mechanisms acting in concert rather than the result of one undif-
ferentiated general- purpose mechanism.
Evolutionary psychologists test their hypotheses using methods shared with other psycholo-
gists, including observational techniques, questionnaires, and neural imaging. They also use 
methods not shared with other psychologists. For example, they borrow from archaeology, com-
parative biology, ethnography, and paleontology (cf. Confer et al. 2010, 112). Evolutionary psy-
chologists widen the scope of hypothesis- testing methods because they have the double burden 
of testing both psychological and evolutionary hypotheses. Evolutionary hypotheses are claims 
about the evolutionary process that led to the representation of a given trait in a population. 
Such hypotheses cannot be tested by simply establishing the prevalence of the trait in a popu-
lation or by establishing that some individuals have an underlying mechanism that reliably 
produces the relevant trait. Barrett emphasizes that evolutionary psychology must be guided by 
the logic and research methods of evolutionary biology if it is to live up to its name (2015, 12).
Throughout the 1990s evolutionary psychologists proposed a huge number of evolved psy-
chological mechanisms. Such mechanisms were proposed to explain all manner of social phe-
nomena and human behavior, including selection of mates, the institution of marriage, the 
prevalence of murder of stepchildren, incest taboos, and differential parental investment in male 
or female offspring. In the last ten years many in the field have required higher standards of 
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test for proposed evolved psychological mechanisms (cf. Barrett 2015; Confer et al. 2010). As 
a result, fewer mechanisms are defended. Some argue that many hypotheses about evolved psy-
chological mechanisms have been straightforwardly falsified (see e.g. Confer et al. 2010). For 
some time Devendra Singh’s (1993; Singh and Luis 1995) hypothesis that men had an evolved 
mechanism for detecting optimal waist/ hip ratios in women was presented as a textbook case 
of an evolved psychological mechanism. Now this specific hypothesis about women’s waist/ hip 
ratios has come under severe critical scrutiny as a result of conflicting empirical findings (see 
e.g. Yu and Shepard 1998). However, there is lots of interesting work on why there is variation 
in women’s waist/ hip ratios within and between cultures that does not invoke optimal waist/ 
hip ratio detection mechanisms in men (see e.g. Cashdan 2008). The evolutionary psychol-
ogy hypotheses that men have an evolved preference for virgins and that male homosexuals 
persist in human populations because of kin altruism have also both been falsified (cf. Confer 
et al. 2010).
Barrett claims that our theory of mind module is a classic example of an “evolved psycho-
logical adaptation” (2015, 211). On the dominant view in cognitive science, our ability to 
attribute beliefs to others and to interpret their behavior via these belief attributions results 
from an underlying psychological mechanism, our theory of mind, that “comes online” at a 
specific time during development. Cognitive psychologists refer to our interpretive capacity as 
“mindreading” (see Nichols and Stich 2003 for a clear presentation of this literature). Barrett 
presents a large amount of work that supports the hypothesis that mindreading is “an evolved 
capacity” (Barrett 2015, 153). Other evolutionary psychology hypotheses that have strong sup-
port include: evolved fear mechanisms underlying our avoidance of snakes and spiders; evolved 
mechanisms for avoiding toxic foods; and evolved social exchange cheat detection mechanisms 
(Barrett 2015; Confer et al. 2010). As we shall see, while some critics of evolutionary psychol-
ogy focus on hypotheses that evolutionary psychologists agree lack support, others focus on 
hypotheses that evolutionary psychologists take to be well supported. We now turn to debates 
about evolutionary psychology.
Debates about Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary psychology’s predecessor, human sociobiology, was attacked on several fronts. 
Biologists and philosophers of biology argued that human sociobiologists did not practice biol-
ogy as rigorously as their counterparts in animal behavioral biology. Critics also argued that 
sociobiologists were guided by a narrow view of evolutionary theory, referred to as adaptation-
ism, and that the phenomena they attempted to account for could be better explained by appeal-
ing to a range of alternative hypotheses (see e.g. Gould 1978; Kitcher 1985; R. C. Lewontin 
1979). Other critics argued that human sociobiology was sexist, genetically determinist, and 
ignored human diversity. Human sociobiologists were also accused of inadequately character-
izing culture and underestimating cultural influences on our diverse behavior (cf. Fehr 2011; 
Segerstråle 2000). All these criticisms, in slightly varied form, have been carried over to evolu-
tionary psychology and make up the “barrage of criticism” that Barrett refers to.
Barrett (cf. Confer et  al. 2010) attempts to deflect some of the barrage of criticism by 
pointing out that “the rise of evolutionary psychology has led to rampant generation of 
evolution- flavored hypotheses throughout the social sciences, not all of which would pass 
basic tests of evolutionary plausibility” (Barrett 2015, 12). Barrett implies that if critics are 
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focused on this kind of work, then he is their ally. He also rejects evolutionary psychology 
hypotheses that are not framed as they would be by animal biologists and other evolutionary 
theorists. However, this move of Barrett’s only accounts for a portion of the barrage of criti-
cism. The focus of many critics of evolutionary psychology is popular works (see e.g. Pinker 
2002; Wright 1994) rather than “evolution- flavored hypotheses” found in the pages of social 
science journals. Sociologists worry that popular books championing evolutionary psychol-
ogy leave the impression that the science about the evolutionary origins of our behavior and 
culture is settled. They go on to argue that this situation is further compounded by media 
presentations of such popular works as works of science (see e.g. Fuller 2006; Jackson and 
Rees 2007). Further, critics have sometimes assumed that their critical attacks on popular 
works championing evolutionary psychology are sufficient to undermine the evolutionary 
psychology research program. This situation is a bit of a mess and confusing for students of 
philosophy of social science. My recommendation is that we focus our attention on criti-
cal discussion of the work of practicing evolutionary psychology researchers. Discussion of 
the popularization of scientific practice and presentation of popularizations as if they were 
cutting- edge science by the media is important but will not be our focus here (Barker 2015 
confronts some of these important issues). We first turn to the debate over evolutionary psy-
chologists’ notion of human nature.
Evolutionary Psychology and Human Nature
Evolutionary psychologists propose that human nature is biologically based. Many critics chal-
lenge this view. Some reject the view on the grounds that our nature is culturally specified 
rather than biologically based (see e.g. Prinz 2012). This type of criticism is undermined by 
the unfounded presupposition that culture and biology can be clearly distinguished (cf. Buller 
2005). Work on cultural evolution and on the complex co- evolutionary processes underlying 
many human traits reveals that to the extent that cultural factors and biological factors can be 
distinguished, they both play important roles in the evolution of human behavior, social organi-
zation, and artifact production (see e.g. Lewens 2015; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Sterelny 2012). 
Criticisms of evolutionary psychologists’ concept of human nature with more bite invoke evolu-
tion. The charge is that evolutionary psychologists’ concept of human nature is not consistent 
with evolutionary thought (cf. Buller 2005; Lewens 2015).
Evolutionary psychologists propose that human nature is expressed in cultural universals and 
its biological basis is the collection of evolved psychological mechanisms we share (Tooby and 
Cosmides 1990). Buller (2005, especially ch. 8)  draws on Hull (1986) and Sober (1980) to 
argue that this notion of human nature presupposes a species concept that is not accepted by 
evolutionary biologists and fails to acknowledge or account for human variation. The first charge 
is that evolutionary psychologists take the species homo sapiens to be characterized by a collec-
tion of shared traits. This is not how biologists characterize species. Rather, species are lineages, 
historical entities with beginnings and ends, in the case of extinction. The view that species are 
identified by a cluster of traits that their members share has the following consequence: we could 
go extinct and at another time a population could arise with the same defining cluster of traits in 
common. On the view of species presupposed by evolutionary psychologists, the new population 
would be the same species as us. This conclusion is not supported by the evolutionary view of 
species. On this view the only way to be part of the same species is to be part of the same lineage. 
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So the account of species presupposed in evolutionary psychologists’ account of human nature 
is not an evolutionary one.
Buller’s second charge is that evolutionary psychologists’ account of human nature ignores 
or cannot account for human variation (cf. Lewens 2015; Ramsey 2013). Humans exhibit a 
huge amount of morphological, physiological, behavioral, and cultural variation; like all other 
organisms we exhibit within- species variation. To propose that our nature consists in universal 
traits, or the mechanisms underlying those universal traits, ignores all this variation. If evolu-
tionary psychologists counter that their view accounts for variation in terms of what we have 
in common, they still face problems. Evolutionary biologists, such as population geneticists, 
are in the business of confronting and explaining variation. For them, variation is a property of 
populations and they strive to account for the distribution of variation in a given population 
in terms of the distribution of variation in earlier populations that gave rise to the one under 
study. Variation in the population can also be due to the range of responses organisms have to 
the different environments they confront (cf. Buller 2005; Hull 1986; Sober 1980). Evolutionary 
biologists do not propose an underlying set of mechanisms that organisms share whose expres-
sion is disrupted in different environments. This is how evolutionary psychologists appear to use 
their account of human nature to explain variation. If so, their account of human nature is not 
an evolutionary one.
Barrett responds to both of Buller’s charges but first combines them as follows: “Some phi-
losophers and biologists argue that the fuzzy and variable nature of species and populations 
means that treating any species as having a nature is a kind of category error— species just 
aren’t that kind of thing” (2015, 320). Barrett agrees that other evolutionary psychologists 
have ignored or failed to account for human variation; further, he agrees that it is the job 
of any evolutionary approach to confront and account for variation. However, he objects to 
critics who suggest that we cannot present an evolutionarily sound notion of human nature. 
He says, “Whatever human nature is, it’s a biological phenomenon, with all that implies” 
(321). What Barrett takes this to imply is that human nature is a thing that is “a big wobbly 
cloud that is different from the population clouds of squirrels and palm trees. To understand 
human minds and behaviors, we need to understand the properties of our own cloud, as messy 
as it might be” (332). So human nature is not a collection of traits we share but the collection 
of all of the traits expressed in our lineage.
Buller anticipates Barrett’s alternate view and responds as follows: “one possibility is that 
the concept of human nature could refer to the totality of human behavior and psychology.” 
He goes on to say that this version of human nature “has no particular theoretical meaning; 
it is merely an abbreviation for talking about the rich tapestry of human existence” (Buller 
2005, 420). Tim Lewens characterizes a similar account of human nature to Barrett’s as “sim-
ply a collection of informative truths about humans” (2015, 77). He goes on to say “Once an 
account of human nature is loosened up so as to make room for variation … there is no way 
to gain control of it” (79). According to Buller and Lewens, then, Barrett’s attempt to salvage 
an evolutionarily viable account of human nature results in no account of human nature at 
all or, at best, results in what Lewens calls a “libertine” account of human nature, which is 
innocuous but does no explanatory work. There are several people currently attempting to 
defend accounts of human nature that both serve evolutionary psychology and are consist-
ent with evolutionary thought in general (see e.g. Machery 2008). As a result, this debate 
about evolutionary psychology is ongoing. We now turn to issues surrounding evolutionary 
psychologists’ adaptationist approach.
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Evolutionary Psychology and Adaptationism
Buller’s (2005) critical work on evolutionary psychology is structurally similar to Philip Kitcher’s 
(1985) critical work on human sociobiology. Buller argues that evolutionary psychologists’ work 
can be challenged on evolutionary grounds and he also proposes alternate explanatory hypoth-
eses for various phenomena that evolutionary psychologists take themselves to have accounted 
for. Buller’s support for some of his alternate hypotheses has been questioned (see e.g. Machery 
and Barrett 2007) but his criticisms of evolutionary psychology on evolutionary grounds are 
supported and shared by many evolutionary biologists and philosophers of biology (see e.g. 
Coyne 2009; Downes 2015; Lewens 2015; R. Lewontin 1998; E. A. Lloyd 1999; E. A. Lloyd 
and Feldman 2002; Richardson 2007; Woodward and Cowie 2004). Here we focus on just one 
strand of Buller’s evolutionary criticism, his attack on the type of adaptationism evolutionary 
psychologists adopt.
There are numerous versions of adaptationism (cf. Godfrey- Smith 2001; Lewens 2009) and 
here we focus just on the adaptationism defended by evolutionary psychologists. The term 
adaptationism was used as a pejorative by some biologists (see e.g. Gould and Lewontin 1979; 
R. C. Lewontin 1979), but subsequent work reveals that this charge does not discriminate well 
between distinct kinds of evolutionary hypotheses (cf. Downes 2015; R.  C. Lewontin 1978; 
Seger and Stubblefield 1996). Evolutionary psychologists hold that psychological mechanisms 
of interest, such as our mechanism supporting snake avoidance, are adaptations. These mecha-
nisms are products of natural selection as opposed to other evolutionary processes such as drift or 
meiotic drive (see Sober 2000 for a nice introduction to various alternate evolutionary processes 
to selection). An adaptation, in this sense, is a specialized mechanism that solves a specific 
problem that the organism faced in its environment. These adaptations are also universal in the 
population. Evolutionary biologists refer to such traits as “fixed” or “at fixation.” Evolutionary 
psychologists take psychological adaptations to be most closely analogous to organs such as kid-
neys. On this account, the snake fear mechanism evolved to solve the problem of dangerous 
snakes in the environment just as the kidney evolved to solve the problem of balancing bodily 
fluids. Buller argues that this account of adaptation is incomplete or too narrow.
Lewens nicely summarizes one main thrust of Buller’s criticism as follows: “there is no special 
significance attached to traits that are at, or near to, fixation, and the explanatory processes 
that evolutionists deal in are just as suited to accounting for traits that are present in different 
proportions” (2015, 66). Buller points out that phenotypic plasticity— the ability of an organism 
to change phenotype in response to its environment— is just as likely to be the result of natural 
selection as a fixed phenotype. Some features of environments are very stable and predictable 
and selection may favor one sure- fire mechanism that helps the organism deal with these fea-
tures, but lots of environments are highly dynamic and unpredictable and produce more selec-
tion pressure for flexible response. Many biologists, philosophers, and social scientists emphasize 
that humans are highly flexible and all claim that it is this flexibility that is the product of 
natural selection in our case (see e.g. Buller 2005; Cashdan 2013; Godfrey- Smith 1996; Griffiths 
2011; Ramsey 2013; Sterelny 2003). On this view, not only is flexibility of phenotypic response 
to our dynamic environments a product of natural selection, but variation at both the genetic 
and the phenotypic level is sustained by natural selection. For example, a lot of genetic diversity 
is maintained in the genes underlying our immune systems. What Buller and others point out 
here is that natural selection is not just a process that fixes traits in a population or fixes genes 
in a population.
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Barrett responds to this line of criticism by saying that evolutionary psychologists acknowl-
edge phenotypic plasticity and humans’ flexible responses to changing environments. Critics 
still maintain that this acknowledgement is not enough. The idea here is that if evolutionary 
psychologists took on board a more encompassing notion of adaptationism, they would avail 
themselves of a wider range of evolutionary hypotheses about how humans deal with their 
dynamic environments. Instead, the critics say, evolutionary psychologists always resort to 
accounting for our flexibility in the same way: we have a collection of specialized psychological 
mechanisms, shaped by selection, that allow for our flexible response. This debate about adap-
tationism is also ongoing. Critics have yet to engage Barrett’s discussion of phenotypic plastic-
ity and our flexible response to dynamic environments. What we turn to now is an alternative 
proposal about the evolution of mindreading, which gives a sense of the kind of alternative 
hypotheses evolutionary psychologists rule out by considering only hypotheses about selected 
psychological mechanisms.
Alternate Evolutionary Hypotheses about the  
Origin of Mindreading
As we saw above, cognitive and evolutionary psychologists refer to our ability to attribute beliefs 
and desires to others and to explain behavior in terms of these postulates as mindreading. We 
saw that Barrett claims that our mechanism underlying our mindreading ability is a classic adap-
tation in his sense of the term. Kim Sterelny (Sterelny 2003) argues that this is not the right 
approach to explaining mindreading at all. Sterelny says that the way evolutionary psychologists 
approach mindreading is modeled on the way psycholinguists account for language. On this 
account, our linguistic ability is explained in terms of an innate mechanism, or set of mecha-
nisms, that we all have, which enables us to communicate in a language. Other language speak-
ers provide the environmental triggers that bring the language mechanism on line. Sterelny 
argues that this line of reasoning, one that is widespread in developmental cognitive psychology, 
is perhaps only well suited to the case of language. Sterelny thinks that the extension of this 
explanatory approach to mindreading, moral judgment, and all manner of human capacities 
is misguided. The key to Sterelny’s criticism of evolutionary psychology is his presentation of 
alternate evolutionary hypotheses.
Nativists like Noam Chomsky originally responded to behaviorists. Nativists argued that 
behaviorism did not have the resources to explain complex capacities such as our linguistic 
ability. Peter Godfrey- Smith (1996) characterizes this debate as one between proponents of 
internalist as opposed to externalist forms of explanation. Internalists’ explanations invoke 
mechanisms inside us in explanations of behavior. Psycholinguists’ innate grammar, invoked 
to account for our ability to learn and speak languages, is such a mechanism. Externalists’ 
explanations rely on features of our environment. For example, behaviorist psychologists 
account for our behavior, even complex behavior such as learning and speaking a language, 
in terms of stimuli and responses to those stimuli. Sterelny is an externalist in this sense but 
his externalism gives him many more explanatory resources than behaviorists have. Sterelny’s 
(2003) externalist approach to mindreading is evolutionary and emphasizes niche construction 
(see Laland, Oddling- Smee, and Feldman 2000 for an introduction to niche construction). 
Behaviorists construe our environment as a collection of stimuli. Sterelny invokes a highly 
structured environment that has a great deal of potential for shaping development. The basic 
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idea of niche construction is that organisms create aspects of their own environment— rabbit 
burrows, termite mounds, human tools, and other artifacts— and these structured environments 
constrain development but also, crucially, produce different selection pressures. Applying all 
this to mindreading, we get the proposal that humans have various basic perceptual capacities, 
doubtless shared with our primate ancestors, which, in the relevantly structured environment, 
can support our interpretation of others. On this approach, there is no need to seek the selec-
tive regimen that produced one specialized mechanism for mindreading. Rather we specify the 
structured environment that would support the re- tuning of basic perceptual capacities for the 
task of interpreting others.
Sterelny’s is not the only alternative hypotheses about the evolution of mindreading. Sarah 
Hrdy (S. B. Hrdy 2009) defends an interesting evolutionary approach that places the selectively 
relevant environment for our mindreading capacity in our infant life stage. The idea here is that 
mindreading is a product of several factors. First, we spend a long time completely dependent 
on the care of others relative to other animals, including our closest primate relatives. Second, 
one of the keys to surviving this life stage is to have a grasp on who is a caretaker and who is 
not and to make sure that we are in good hands. Third, Hrdy relies on life history theory, whose 
proponents differentiate between selection pressures at different life stages of organisms (see 
Roff 2002 for a comprehensive introduction to life history theory). For example, there are quite 
different selection pressures on adult frogs and tadpoles. According to Hrdy, our adult mindread-
ing capacity is built upon this infant survival strategy. Neither Sterelny nor Hrdy proposes and 
defends specialized psychological mechanisms that evolved for mindreading, but both propose 
evolutionary hypotheses intended to account for our capacity of mindreading.
To date evolutionary psychologists have not responded directly to the challenges posed by 
alternative evolutionary hypotheses about mindreading such as Sterelny’s and Hrdy’s. Barrett 
discusses neither of these hypotheses and does not respond to the line of criticism of evolution-
ary psychology that accompanies them. Further productive debates about evolutionary psychol-
ogy could begin here. The general issue at stake would be where the evolutionary psychologists 
favored approach is best used and where other evolutionary approaches do better (see Laland 
and Brown 2002 for a presentation of many of the alternate evolutionary approaches to explain-
ing human behavior). If future debates headed in this direction, participants would have to be 
well versed in evolutionary theory, in all its guises, and prepared to have some of their cherished 
hypotheses subjected to careful scrutiny.
Conclusion
These three debates (or potential debate in one case) are highlighted here because they exem-
plify the kind of productive philosophy of science discussions we can have about evolutionary 
psychology. As noted above, much of the controversy about evolutionary psychology is focused 
on popular presentations of work in the field. There is much work for socially engaged philoso-
phers of science to do in assessing the impact of popular evolutionary psychology on policy 
and society in general and Gillian Barker (2015) has begun to make useful inroads here. One 
recommendation is that philosophers critically assess evolutionary psychology by focusing on 
research in the field rather than by focusing on popularizations of that work. The critical work 
of assessing the influence of popularizations of evolutionary psychology is properly focused on 
popular works.
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